A Hindu physicist in Delhi believes in a
transcendent divine force, but adopts a materialist stance for his latest
research paper. A Christian legislator in Rio de Janeiro has
theist beliefs when praying, but a Marxist stance in the political arena. A
Humanist in New York has Neo-Darwinist beliefs, but derives an ethical system from
pantheism. We are used to considering people’s belief systems as belonging to a
single tradition, but on examination we uncover a rich tapestry of co-existing
metaphysical viewpoints.
We have no control over how we come into
this world, and wherever we are born, in whichever culture and to whichever
family, we acquire certain beliefs which combine to define the reality in which
we live. It may be the case that there is an external reality that is the same
for all of us, but we each experience this world through our own senses and
beliefs. It is as if we are each dealt a hand of cards which define our personal
reality – we can change the individual cards in this hand, and we can hold
cards that we do not use, but what we cannot do is cast our hand aside and
refuse to play.
I have already shown how Wittgenstein’s
notion of a language game reveals that our private vocabulary, our idiolects,
can change our personal (emic) realities (contrasted to the external, etic
reality). Let us consider this in the context of a framing worldview,
specifically in relation to the word ‘God’. To an individual who cannot find a
way to make this word meaningful, there can be no God, nor evidence for God –
one cannot find support for a word that has no personal meaning. Conversely, to
an individual for whom the word God is meaningful, the notion of evidence for
God may equally be meaningless as everything that can be experienced may be
considered evidence of God. Neither situation constitutes a genuine ontological
statement about God – we cannot test metaphysical claims, but this is
categorically not the same as claiming that metaphysics are meaningless or
inherently false – they are simply outside the domain of testable knowledge.
Neither is the meaning of the word ‘god’ to
be taken for granted. We could be referring to God in the theistic sense of a
personal God, or we could be referring to a more transcendent notion of God
such as the Hindu idea of Brahman – an infinite, unchanging reality beyond the
reality of our existence. Or we could be talking about gods in the sense of,
say, the Greek pantheon, who are in some sense lesser beings than that which we
refer to as Allah or Jehovah. For clarity, I shall call a transcendent deity the
Divine (and transcendent non-deities the Absolute), a personal
deity God with a capital G, and lesser deities gods with a lower
case g. And as an added complication, some systems (especially Hindu beliefs)
incorporate all three levels in parallel.
Let us now look at a few of the cards from
the first suit in our deck of realities.
The Numinous Experience
The word ‘numinous’, coined by Rudolf Otto,
describes an experience of the wholly Other – something external to the
individual, and generally the tremendous and mysterious power of this Other is
emphasised in numinous experiences. Ninian Smart, who analysed religious and
secular worldviews in purely phenomenological terms, considers the numinous
experience to be one of the central religious experiences, and relates it to
devotional worship (which he calls bakhti – a Hindu term) and hence to
theistic systems and their relatives.
Theism refers to belief in a personal God, that is, a God who is concerned
with our actions and (perhaps) takes an active role in the world, albeit unseen
and perhaps beyond mortal comprehension. Theistic beliefs declare their own
systems of ethics as having originated from this personal God. We are perhaps
more familiar with the Theism card in our deck than any other, because the
Abrahamic faiths (the People of the Book, as the Muslims say) are traditionally
interpreted through this view. But this is by no means a given, as we will see.
Dualism in the Hindu style does not focus on the personal aspect of the
divine, but rather on the different nature of the Divine from the Soul – the
distinction of atman from Brahman. From the Divine springs dharma,
a concept central to Eastern religions (indeed, the Dharmic faiths – Hinduism,
Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism – are often contrasted with the Abrahamic faiths),
and dharma provides a system of ethics; it’s very name means ‘proper conduct’
or ‘right way of living’. Unlike the law-based approach of the People of the
Book, the focus of dharma is on self-realisation, to which other practices are
secondary.
Deism
describes a Christian approach which is closer to Hindu dualism than
conventional theism; the focus here is on God as the Divine, and the personal
God of theism is either rejected, or absent. Popular among Christian
intellectuals in the 17th and 18th centuries, deism plays
down the importance of revealed religion, and instead sees belief in the Divine
as inherently observable in the world. In essence, God creates the universe and
sets it running, but then plays no further part in its operation. Ethics still
follow from Christian writings, although the justifications and meaning of
scripture are vastly different from theistic approaches. One could be forgiven
for mistaking deism as a forerunner to modern secular atheistic views, but the
numinous experience remains firmly rooted here.
Transtheism shows another variation, taking the Divine of deism or Hindu
dualism, but having a personal God emanate from this. Johannes Eckhart’s interpretation
of Christianity with a deitas (the Divine) and a deus (God) shows this form, and
we can find a similar system in Islam with ibn ’Arabi. Here, ethics are
inherited as in theism or deism, but the metaphysical framework is more
complex.
Transpolytheism connects the same idea to lesser gods, and is a common idea in
Hindu belief systems – the gods are seen as manifestations of a greater Divine
force. Indeed, it is generally a mistake to consider Hindu beliefs to be
polytheistic (in the sense this word is usually employed). There is always the
transcendent Divine behind or beyond the gods. Indeed, some Hindu mystics would
not recognise the lesser gods as anything but metaphors expressing some deeper
divine message. As before, dharma provides a system of ethics, and this follows
from the Divine.
The numinous experience is associated with
theism and related views, but the belief systems which centre upon this idea of
a mysterious and powerful Other also lead to more mystical views – all the
Abrahamic faiths have their mystical traditions. Here, we move into the second
suit of our deck.
The Panenhenic Experience
Robert Zaehner coined this term to describe
an ‘all in one’ experience of dramatic unity with nature or with the cosmos.
Ninian Smart (to whom I am indebted for much of this piece) seems uncertain how
to use the term confidently within his own system, so I am choosing to apply
the term to describe mystical experiences of union with the Other (as distinct
from the contemplative experience of inner unity, or union with the inner
non-other) rather than in the sense of nature spirituality which is probably
closer to Zaehner’s original intent.
Monism can describe many different beliefs. In Sufi Islam, reality
emanates from the Divine (from Allah), and every instant the universe returns
to the Divine and is refreshed. In this instance, a mystical element has
emerged from a numinous beginning, and an ethical system can be inherited from
that root.
Non-dualism is another form of monism, for example, the Hindu school of Advaita Vedanta, which sees the ordinary perspective of the world of multiple things
as an illusion. Everything is one – the Divine, God, gods and mortals are all
expressions of the same thing. Here, dharma is inherent to all things (since
all things are one), and so ethics are a kind of Absolute that partners with
the Divine.
Pantheism describes a similar kind of situation – everything is of an all
encompassing, immanent Divine, or alternatively God and the universe (or nature)
are equivalent. Hinduism is the oldest pantheistic system (although Hindu
beliefs are too diverse to be considered under one single framework), although
all of the Abrahamic faiths develop this in some form; Spinoza for Judaism, for
instance, or Sufi approaches to Islam. Ethics may be inherited from earlier
doctrines where applicable, or may evolve directly from the pantheist
perspective – our interconnectedness makes any harm done to others undesirable
as it is in effect harm done to ourselves.
Naturalistic Pantheism is an atheistic variation, seeing the universe as non-conscious and
non-sentient, but still a meaningful focus for spiritual fulfilment. Here, the
universe is divine and the Earth is sacred, and this provides some basis from
which ethics may be derived.
Taoism is too complicated a subject to cover briefly, but expresses
similar themes and has been connected to the panenhenic experience. Nature is
governed by the way (or Tao) – it is perfectly harmonious (where man has not
interfered with it), non-action is preferred, but is not the same as inaction –
rather, an idea similar to dharma is at work. The Tao is Absolute and eternal,
and resisting it is self-defeating: as Lao Tsu noted one cannot use force to
conquer the universe, for this will just cause resistance. One should ‘just do
what needs to be done.’
By this point, we are a long way from the
numinous experience of theism, and into a new and different (yet complimentary)
perspective. Our third suit takes the mystical experience of the panenhenic,
and turns it inwards.
The Contemplative Experience
Smart views religious experience as
existing chiefly in two polar modes – the numinous experience of the Other, and
the contemplative experience or inner unity, where the distinction between
subject and object vanishes. Other experiences, such as the panenhenic, are
admitted, but Smart’s model is chiefly focussed on these two poles.
Furthermore, Smart sees how traditions that begin in the numinous (e.g.
Abrahamic faiths, and older faiths such as Zoroastrianism) develop a
contemplative element (e.g. in Sufi and Christian mysticism), while religions
that begin in the contemplative eventually develop a devotional element.
Non-theism is a concept that relates to the contemplative experience viewed in
isolation. It is not necessarily belief in the non-existence of gods (as with
atheism), but rather that gods or God are not the relevant matter. In
particular, gods are seen as irrelevant to non-theistic beliefs. Rather, dhyāna,
which is a type or aspect of meditation, is central to the practices of
non-theistic systems. In short: the focus is inward rather than outward to the
transcendent. Non-theistic systems tend to still posit an Absolute of some
kind, they just do not see this Absolute as sentient in any manner, and ethics
are derived from this Absolute (as we have already seen in the example of
dharma).
Hindu dhyāna is a means of gaining self-knowledge, and thus furthering dharma.
The ultimate goal is to separate maya (illusion) from reality. An inner unity
is sought that will allow the practitioner to achieve the ultimate state of
moksha or liberation. Ethics generally relate to the concept of dharma, as in
the numinous cases we have examined before. Few Hindu systems are non-theistic,
but the term is applied to such a diverse range of beliefs it cannot be
excluded.
Theravada (Buddhist) Jhāna is a meditative practice
with a similar role: inner contemplation is seen as being conducive to
detatchment with the ultimate goal of liberation, or nirvana – the
extinguishing of self (but categorically not the annihilation of self). From
this quest for liberation, an ethical system emerges, but Theravada is strictly
non-theistic.
Mahayana (Buddhist) dhyāna shows another variation on the same theme, but
forms a lesser role, being only part of the practice of the Great Vehicle
(mahayana), which is the other major branch of Buddhism along with Theravada. However, in Mahayana, the theme of bakhti
(devotional worship) re-emerges, albeit without gods, per se. The contemplative
and numinous experiences have rejoined each other once again, but here beginning
in the contemplative and ending in the numinous.
Ch’an/Zen Buddhism completes the picture, as in these
variations on the meditative theme, the panenhenic experience becomes joined to
the contemplative experience. The experience of inner unity and the experience
of union with the Other become so closely related that there is no distinction
between the two. Indeed, the notion of subject and object are entirely
obliterated.
From these non-theistic positions where the
notion of God or gods is secondary or misleading, we move into our final suit.
Nonreligions
Here, the religious experiences of the
numinous, panenhenic or contemplative state of inner unity are rejected or
absent. These worldviews are not considered religions by their practitioners,
although they often contain metaphysical and ethical elements which can make them
seem religious to an observer (in the case of the most vehement adherents,
intolerance is just as likely to occur as from an entrenched religious
position). But these cards may exist in the same hand as the cards from other
suits, and the human capacity to take disparate beliefs and unify them into a
coherent system remains breathtaking.
Materialism is not a worldview people identify for themselves so much as a
designation philosophers have applied to those worldviews which consider the
material universe to be paramount – that is, existence is seen as being wholly
or chiefly matter. I personally find this view slightly strange: given the
extent to which the Copernican and Darwinian views toppled the notion of man’s
position at the centre of the universe, why presume that all that exists can be
detected by man’s senses and instruments? But this is a minor point, and in any
case does not affect the value of materialism in underpinning the modern skeptical view and, more critically, providing engineering practices with a
firm foundation. Ethics are absent, unless focus on the testable can be seen as
a kind of partial ethical view.
Marxism is a particular form of materialism in which a specific system of
metaphysics and ethics are derived from a central narrative which expresses
history in terms of class warfare. Parallels can be made with how many
religions draw their metaphysics and ethics from specific narratives. Smart
suggests that the failure of Marxism in Soviet Russia came from ethical flaws
within Marxism – the class warfare metaphor conflicted with basic human rights
when used as a the justification for totalitarianism, and with traditional
societal values when opposing religion. But as I have noted previously, there
are signs of a new softening attitude to religion among modern Marxists.
Nationalism is a similar approach in some respects, but here the prime factor
is the importance of the nation state to which one claims identity. This card
can exist in the hand alongside those of other suits, although certain tensions
result – consider the collision of Christianity and nationalism in the United States: to an outside observer, it sometimes seems that the nation is
worshipped more fervently than God. Ethics derived from nationalism concern
solely the role of the individual with respect to the state.
Sportism is a neologism I am coining to describe the non-religious
experience of the devotee of a particular sporting team. It is similar to
nationalism in terms of the issues of identity, but no ethical element emerges.
One wishes one’s team to be victorious, but this does not provide the basis for
a system of ethics. As secular rituals have gradually supplanted religious
rituals in Western society, sport can become an incomplete substitute for
religion.
Nihilism denotes a rejection of ethics. Life has no truth, and no action can
be known to be preferable to any other. I consider this position to be rather
pointless, and equivalent to giving up on any hope of resolving issues in religious
metaphysics or secular ethics. Since I consider both of these problems to be
readily solvable, nihilism seems to me a lazy escape for the depressive or
rebellious. I prefer Michael Novak’s view that the experience of nothingness
can be the beginning of ethical enquiry, instead of transforming this
experience into an ideology, and rejecting ethics entirely.
Neo-Darwinism began as a scientific theory (the modern evolutionary synthesis)
but has recently developed into something of a nonreligion, taking the
gene-centric view as the highest authority for understanding reality, and considering
other approaches (e.g. religion) as inherently inferior. A parallel can be made
with the way Marxism emerges from its central narrative, except here the ‘narrative’
is couched in abstract scientific terms such as genes and fitness. Although
this belief does not lead to an ethical system, a common misunderstanding of
its doctrine is to believe that the “selfish gene” metaphor somehow justifies
or excuses self-centred behaviour, or to believe that procreation is the
highest goal – confusions that result from applying an interpretive scientific
model to an ethical context. It is interesting to compare Neo-Darwinism’s
encroachment on metaphysical or ethical subjects with the Creation Scientists’
imposition of metaphysics onto science: both can be seen as category errors.
Multiversism is a neologism I am coining to describe the belief system that
results from the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum physics. We have already
seen that there are other quantum interpretations that function as
nonreligions, but the widespread popularity of multiversism marks it out for
special attention. The basic idea is that all possible quantum states ‘exist’
in other universes – a metaphysical belief which renders quantum theory easier
for certain scientists to digest, but which cannot lead to an ethical system.
However, it may lead to a variation on the panenhenic experience – a few
multiversists report an experience of instantaneous awareness of all other
quantum universes that seems to constitute an oxymoronic instance of a secular
‘religious’ experience.
Modal Realism is a term coined by the philosopher David Lewis to express his
belief that the possible worlds of modal logic were as real as our own
universe. At first, this seems to be a modified version of multiversism, but in
the Many Worlds quantum interpretation the laws of physics (and presumptions of
metaphysics) are generally assumed to be the same in each universe. In Modal
Realism, all possible worlds are considered viable – the variation of
these possible worlds is thus unlimited. At this point, we cannot exclude gods
on materialist grounds: all possible worlds exist, hence it is not a question
of whether God exists – this is most certainly the case in some possible worlds
– it is only a question of whether or not our reality contains such an
entity.
With this, our brief journey through a handful
of cards from the deck of realities is complete, and we have come full circle.
Shuffling the Deck
We do not choose the cards that are dealt
to us, although we can to some extent alter the hand with which we play the
game of reality. Each of us, in our own way, has the power to discard those
cards we do not wish to play with, or to pick up cards that will help us play
the game. Attempts to evaluate individual cards as True or False are entirely
misleading, for such statements cannot be validated meaningfully – all the
cards are there to be played with, it is only how we play with them that matters.
We must find those cards that suit how we wish to play the game, and accept
that other hands are not only possible, but inevitable. This may be difficult, but
the rewards are more than commensurate to the challenge.
