Myths of Evolution (1): Scientific Metaphysics

No aspect of modern scientific thinking crosses so unnoticed into metaphysical territory as people's beliefs about evolution.

Metaphysics, the philosophical exploration of that which cannot be tested or proved, lies beyond the borders of science. I have used the term Popper's milestone to denote a boundary between science (methodical research) and metaphysics (the untestable), following the work of Karl Popper who felt that falsification – the capacity to prove something untrue – was a proper boundary for science. Others have disputed this claim, and with just cause, but as a demarcation of the limits of metaphysics Popper's idea remains salient.

Science never manages to be entirely free of metaphysics – the belief that it does, that there is a notion of “scientific truth” in some absolute sense, is itself a metaphysical belief. Indeed, one of the most prevalent confusions about science in modern times is that “scientific” should be taken to mean “proven true by science”, rather than “conducted in a spirit of formal investigation”. Thus, models that have been rejected, such as phlogiston or the ether, cannot be called “unscientific” without falling under the criticism raised by Thomas Kuhn:

If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced by the same sort of methods and held for the same sorts of reason that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold today. Given the alternatives, the historian must choose the latter. Out-of-date theories are not in principle unscientific because they have been discarded.

In a similar vein, when I talk about “myths of evolution” I am not accusing various ideas of being unscientific, I am talking about stories that are being spun out of the scientific theories in circulation. We are comfortable calling phlogiston a myth, because we presume that myths are not true, but this is not what I mean when I invoke the term 'myth'. When I, for instance, call “the selfish gene” a myth of evolution, I do not mean that the gene-centric view is not a valid scientific perspective, but rather that the idea of a “selfish gene” is an abstract embellishment that puts a particular spin onto an otherwise neutral concept. This is what I mean by 'myth' in this context: a metaphysical story that expresses a particular interpretative bias.

When dealing with the subject of evolution, myths abound. It is not Intelligent Design which is the chief culprit – most intellectuals can spot that this is a metaphysical belief about a scientific topic – but rather the various stories that are spun out of the numerous competing models developed for understanding the putative processes of natural selection. Because these models are all incomplete, speculative and by-and-large untestable, they accumulate a rich scientific mythology which is then mistaken for knowledge and (even more embarrassingly) used as the basis of teleological games largely indistinguishable from those conducted under a theistic paradigm.

In this short serial, I present five of these evolutionary myths, and offer for each an alternative story that is equally compatible with the current theories but entirely different in both meaning and implication. To begin with, I will discuss the iconography of the ladder of progress, depicted above in its most familiar form, and the reasons why this myth can be so misleading.

Next Week: Myth #1: The Ladder of Progress

Comments

[Deirdra]

This serial sounds like it's going to be fascinating. I, for one, am often annoyed by the abuse of "evolutionary biology" arguments in justifying human behaviour that I perceive as unethical (particularly with regards to gender inequality) so I look forward to reading about these myths you describe!

[Isegoria]

Myth is a terribly loaded term to use for a metaphor like the selfish gene — which hasn't been passed down orally over countless generations, which involves no supernatural elements, which makes testable predictions, etc.

To Deirdra I would point out that Dawkins himself (author of The Selfish Gene) considers it a terrible mistake to equate natural and good. It may be perfectly natural to murder, rape, and steal — at least in certain contexts — but that does not make it good or right, and that does not mean it should go unpunished.

[organic io]

Can't wait to see what you've got in store for us here, Chris!

[Peter Crowther]

I'm with Isegoria on this one. Evolutionary biology can come up with potential selection advantages in behaviour that many would consider immoral or unethical, but that's a very different story from *justifying* them.

I've yet to find a justification for anything in the physical sciences, as justice (and hence justification) isn't a physical term. We justify things ethically or morally.

I also agree that myth is a loaded term. I've no doubt Chris intends the loading, and will be interested to see what he does with it. In particular, I'll be fascinated to see what strength of testability he requires of something before it is labelled "science" rather than "metaphysics". Popper's original milestone allowed thought experiments that could not be achieved with current technology or with small amounts of effort, for example. That's a very different notion of "testable" from "testable under a research grant today".

[Chris]

Deirdra: I think you'll find it interesting. The confusion of ideology and theory is a bugbear that haunts science - I hope in this piece to poke it for a while and see what happens. :)

Isegoria: "Myth is a terribly loaded term to use for a metaphor like the selfish gene — which hasn't been passed down orally over countless generations, which involves no supernatural elements, which makes testable predictions, etc."

We can discuss my thoughts on "the selfish gene" when we get to it in a few weeks time. But the metaphor "selfish gene" categorically does not make testable predictions (or, alternatively, if "selfish gene" is to be taken as a prediction, then it is false by definition). You seem to be confusing the theoretical (the gene-centric view) with its encrustations ("the selfish gene"). We'll get to this. :)

As for your interpretation of the word "myth", I'm afraid your version is rather narrow. This term is deployed in many contexts beyond it's meaning in traditional orally-transmitted mythology.

Consider, for instance, the TV show "Mythbusters". Will you accuse this show of being mis-titled because the issues they investigate do not originate in the oral tradition, or are not supernatural?

One of the many well-established meanings to the word 'myth' is an invented story, idea or concept. Evolutionary science is packed full of such stories, arguably intended to make the theoretical (or often in the context of evolution, hypothetical) constructs easier to access - but in doing so they provide a value-laden gloss on an otherwise entirely neutral construct.

By using 'myth' to point at these attached stories I am emphasising the key point of this serial, which is the distinction between neutral models (the supposed product of empirical science) and ideological spins that become attached to them.

In each case, I will also be providing an alternative spin to emphasise that freedom of interpretation applies even in science where it is often assumed to be excluded (because of the mistake of thinking that science produces "truth" rather than "models" or "instruments").

Furthermore, I am not saying that creating a mythology of science is morally wrong - it is, following Kuhn, rather inevitable - but trying to enforce a *specific* myth as scientific fact does a massive disservice to the empirical sciences, and the ubiquity of this kind of philosophical error has become so replete I feel we would do well to own up to what's going on here.

So in summary: yes, myth is a loaded term: but equally loaded are the stories asserted by the myths we're going to examine. I thus consider 'myth' to be an apposite term for what we are going to look at in this serial.

And it makes for a much punchier title than "non-epistemological narrative encrustations of theoretical or hypothetical empirical constructs." :D

Anyway, I suggest you judge each myth on its own merits and see what you think of my assessment.

Thanks for commenting!

Peter: I don't intend to be making value judgements on the body of science, just distinguishing between the scientific models and their metaphysical encrustations (or, in some cases, their metaphysical origins). The fact that I am able to offer an alternative spin in each case will hopefully serve to demonstrate this point.

I'm sure you and others will keep me honest in this regard. :)

[Chris]

PS: "Dawkins himself... considers it a terrible mistake to equate natural and good. It may be perfectly natural to murder, rape, and steal"

Yes, what Dawkins and others often miss is that "natural" is a massively overloaded term. Dawkins presumably intends to deploy "natural" to mean "occurs in nature", but people also use "natural" to mean "proper in the circumstances". This confusion isn't helpful to anyone.

So yes, it may be "natural" to murder, rape and steal, in so much as it happens. But it is also "natural" to trust, love and co-operate. But the former story is told far more often than the latter for some reason. Why might that be?

[Isegoria]

Consider, for instance, the TV show "Mythbusters". Will you accuse this show of being mis-titled because the issues they investigate do not originate in the oral tradition, or are not supernatural?

Mythbusters is about going out and applying empirical methods to test urban legends that have long gone untested. There's nothing jarring — or loaded — about that use of myth.

One of the many well-established meanings to the word 'myth' is an invented story, idea or concept. Evolutionary science is packed full of such stories, arguably intended to make the theoretical (or often in the context of evolution, hypothetical) constructs easier to access - but in doing so they provide a value-laden gloss on an otherwise entirely neutral construct.

I would not consider every invented story, idea, or concept a myth — or even most stories, ideas, or concepts.

Also, I don't see the value-laden gloss of the selfish gene. The metaphor certainly clarifies a counterintuitive notion, but it doesn't argue that genes are bad, for instance, because they're selfish, or that we should behave selfishly because genes are in some sense selfish.

So yes, it may be "natural" to murder, rape and steal, in so much as it happens. But it is also "natural" to trust, love and co-operate. But the former story is told far more often than the latter for some reason. Why might that be?

So, have you read Dawkins' The Selfish Gene? Because one of the major themes of the book is how "selfish" genes explain altruistic behavior — and how there's a precarious balance between good and bad behavior.

[Chris]

Isegoria: yes, I have in fact read all of Dawkins books from the 1970s through to the 1990's. "Climbing Mount Improbable" is my favourite - it does a magnificent job of explaining the central tenets of modern evolutionary theoretical constructs. He also made good progress in hypothetical constructs for explaining otherwise anomalous observations in natural history.

After that, Dawkins went back to his attack on religion (which began in "The Selfish Gene", but was put aside for many years) and I lost interest in giving him my money.

But I learned an awful lot from studying his work. Not as much as from studying Stephen Jay Gould or R.C. Lewontin, but still a major influence in my study of evolution.

Let's have this conversation again after the piece on "The Selfish Gene" (it's part 4, two weeks from this Thursday) - then we won't have to tilt our swords at shadows, and you'll see what I actually have to say on the subject.

Thanks for your patience!